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For the purpose of testing uncovered interest parity (UIP), rates of European currencies against 
the DEM offer a distinct advantage:  ERM membership or informal ERM association induces 
statistically significant mean-reversion in weekly rates.  Thus, unlike for freely floating rates, 
there is an expectations signal that has nontrivial variation and is sufficiently traceable for 
research purposes.  When running the standard regression tests of the unbiased-expectations 
hypothesis at the one-week  horizon,  we  nevertheless obtain essentially zero coefficients  for 
intra-EMS exchange rates (and the familiar negative coefficients for extra-EMS rates).  Even 
more puzzlingly, lagged exchange rate changes remain significant when added to the regression, 
a feature that seems harder to explain as a missing-variable phenomenon.  The deviation from 
UIP is significant not just statistically but also economically:  trading-rule tests reveal that 
for  sufficiently large filters the average  profit per trade exceeds transaction costs,  and that 
cumulative gains can be quite impressive.  The size of the profits and the patterns from buy 
versus sell  decisions  also  allow  us to reject  the risk  premium and the Peso hypotheses as 
separately sufficient explanations. 
JEL classification:  F31. 
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Introduction 
In international finance,  one unresolved  puzzle  is  the forward  bias:  the forward  premiwn 
systematically mispredicts future exchange rate changes, and does so by far more than con-
ventional risk theories predict.1  Fama (1984) finds that the variance of the risk premium-or 
whatever the missing variable is-must be larger than the time-series variance of these con-
ditional expected changes.  It is,  however,  not always obvious how momentous some of these 
findings are.  For example, Fama's moment condition can be met by a missing variable that 
merely consists of misalignments too small to matter relative to trading costs, combined with 
expectations that hardly change over time.  In the same vein, Froot and Thaler (1990)  argue 
that the expected profits are economically small, especially relative to the residual uncertainty. 
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) find that the negative association between forward premium and 
realized exchange-rate change may be a 70s-80s  DEeD phemomenenon;  in wider and more 
recent data the picture looks better.  De Grauwe (1989)  adds that the negative coefficients 
disappear when the base currency is not the USD. Lastly, the statistical significance of the find-
ings is now being doubted.  Roll and Van (2000) show that the near-unit-root characteristics 
of the forward premiwn invalidate the usual standard deviations, and Schotman, Straetmans 
and De Vries (1997)  docwnent a similar phenomenon related to thick tails and outliers in the 
regressor. 
In this paper, we study a new data set, viz. 1985-1998 weekly changes in exchange rates 
against the DEM.  We first document a non-trivial short-run predictability of exchange rates 
created by affiliation to the European Monetary System's Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), 
whether this affiliation be a formal  membership like  for  the Guilder or a  market-perceived 
loose association as for the Swiss Franc. If  Uncovered Interest Parity (DIP) holds, the forward 
premiwn should pick up this strong predictability.  However,  our results from standard DIP 
regression tests on one-week DEM data are not substantially better, and in a sense even worse 
lThe seminal papers are Cumby and Obstfeld (1984)  and Fama (1984);  Froot and Thaler (1990)  offer an 
excellent (albeit dated) survey; Hollifield and Uppal (1997)  bring up a general-equilibrium analysis predicting a 
small bias; Bansal (1997) shows the bias may be large and asymmetric. Is the forward bias economically small?  2 
than in other data sets.  First, in our Cumby-Obstfeld-Fama (henceforth COF) regression tests 
of UIP the slopes for European monies are still far from unity, and very sensitive to data period 
and estimation technique.  Second, the autocorrelations are not affected by the introduction of 
the forward premium as a regressor--evidence that is hard to explain as a missing-variables 
problem positively contradicts UIP and is Even more interesting is the economic significance 
of these combined phenomena (predictable rates, and out-of-synch forward premia):  a trading-
rule test reveals that the cumulative ll-year returns from exploiting the deviations from UIP, 
over and above the average risk premium, turn out to be a few  hundred percentages, in one 
case even reaching 600  percent.  The total size and the details of the returns then allow us to 
conclude that none of the usual suspects is likely to be singly and fully responsible for such a 
result.  Rather, we need at least a combination, possibly reinforced by a more subtle pricing 
effect (like the option features stressed by Baldwin, 1990), or a market inefficiency.  In short, 
we think the puzzle has deepened:  the amount of money left on the table was quite easy to 
spot and bewilderingly large.  Relative to other work on forex technical trading,2 our focus is 
more on UIP and on theories why UIP fails.  Other differences are our use of rates against the 
DEM rather than the USD and, of course, a rule based on reversal rather than momentum. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 1 describes the data and shows that Euro-
pean exchange rates, even against the USD, exhibit cross-correlation.  This implies substantial 
short-run predictability for both ERM and semi-ERM currencies.  Section 2 demonstrates, via 
the standard tests of UIP, that one-week forward premiums totally ignore this predictability. 
To assess the economic significance we provide, in Section 3,  results from a trading rule that 
exploits the predictability.  Section 4 discusses  the likely  or less  likely explanations of our 
findings, and concludes. 
1  Predictability in Intra-European Exchange Rates 
The data we start from are daily and weekly London exchange rates against the GBP and one-
week spot interest rates, both from Datastream (midpoint Barclays quotes, or for USD/BEF, 
National Westminster quotes).  Our data cover  almost thirteen years, starting in 1985/6/1 
(the date where Datastream's coverage is  expanded)  to 1998/4/1 (the date Euroland rates 
2For  results from  daily data see  Levich and Thomas (1993),  Neely,  Weller and Dittmar (1997),  Sweeney 
(1986),  Taylor(1994), and Surajaras and Seeney (1992).  For weekly data see Kho (1996).  Okunev and White 
(2003) use monthly data. Intraday data do not seem to work, see Neely and Weller (2001) and Raj (2000). Is the forward  bias economically small?  3 
became quasi-fixed).  In our tests,  these GBP rates were  re-expressed  into units of DEM. 
The ten resulting exchange rates against the DEM are mostly European:  four hard  core ERM 
currencies  (BEF, DKK, FRF, NLG)  and three intermittently or informally associated with 
the ERM (CHF, ITL, and as the weakest affiliate, GBP)3. To verify whether the findings are 
indeed typical for  European exchange rates we  also  include three major outside currencies 
(USD, JPY, CAD). 
Exchange rate changes against the USD  are commonly accepted to exhibit a slight  but 
statistically clear positive autocorrelation, leading to the profitable momentum-based trading 
results cited in the introduction. For ERM-member rates, tied to each other by a narrow band, 
one naturally expects also cross-correlations:  currencies that for some reason did not follow the 
pack immediately must catch up later. In exploratory research that led to this paper we studied 
daily data against the USD, and found large cross-correlations among ERM-member rates, and 
weaker cross-links with quasi-members.  These links are significant for one- and two-day lags, 
but rarely beyond that.  Also,  we found  that, from  the USD  point of view,  the DEM was 
the bellwether currency, with the other European currencies following the DEM's movements 
against the USD,  partly with a lag.  Switching data to a DEM basis, we accordingly expect 
reversal rather than continuation patterns.  We indeed found clear negative autocorrelations 
at lags 1 and 2 for  ERM-member rates, and traces of negative autocorrelation for  the other 
European currencies.  These results are available on request. 
Tests of whether that predictability is reflected in interest-rate differentials are hampered 
by the fact that for most currencies Datastream offers no long histories of one-day spot rates;4 
but coverage re spot one-week  rates is  adequate.  Thus,  in Table 1 we  document also the 
autocorrelation pattern for  one-week  exchange-rate movements rather than overnight ones, 
first estimated in the regular simple way ("OLS"), and then taking into account the substantial 
fluctuations in uncertainty ("GARCH", using a  GARCH(l,l) variance model and an AR(l) 
mean equation).  We observe strong autocorrelations at lag one for  the first four  currencies, 
the ERM  core  members,  many  times  larger than their standard deviations,  and basically 
no autocorrelation for  the other currencies.  We  also look at subperiods:  the period before 
S Although the Swiss central bank denies intervention, the CHF is widely seen as informally linked to the DEM 
and, now, the Euro.  The ITL was an ERM member but with an unusually wide band. The GBP unilaterally 
tracked the ECU in 1990-1991 as a prelude to formal ERM membership, in the spring of 1992, but dropped out 
in September 1992. 
40vernight and/or tomorrow/next rates are sometimes available, but in daily tests we'd need one-day spot 
(that is, second/third working day) because spot forex is delivered on the second working day. Is the forward  bias economically small?  4 
Table 1:  First-order autocorrelations, weekly 
Autocorrelation coefficients PI  for  individual currencies  averages 
BEF  DKK  FRF  NLG  CHF  ITL  GBP  JPY  CAD  U8D  ERM  ERM 
Total period (1985/6 - 1998/3), u(p)  =  0.039 
OL8  *-0.28  *-0.15  -*0.17  *-0.48  -0.03  0.11  0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.22  0.03 
GARCH  *-0.38  *-0.22  *-0.11  *-0.44  -0.00  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.04  0.01  -0.23  0.01 
Early ERM(tight band, 1985/6 - 1992/8), u(p) = 0.052 
OL8  *-0.36  *-0.30  *-0.13  *-0.51  -0.03  0.03  0.00  -0.03  0.03  0.01  -0.26  -0.01 
GARCH  *-0.39  *-0.28  *-0.17  *-0.52  0.02  0.12  -0.01  -0.04  0.00  -0.01  -0.27  0.01 
Sept 92 - end 93 (turbulence, 1992/9-1993/12), u(p) = 0.12 
OL8  0.02  0.01  *-0.24  *-0.45  0.02  0.13  0.04  0.02  -0.08  0.08  -0.13  0.04 
GARCH  -0.21  0.01  *-0.26  *-0.32  -0.00  0.13  0.07  0.08  -0.21  0.04  -0.16  -0.02 
Late ERM(wide band, 1994/1 - 1998/3), u(p) = 0.066 
OL8  *-0.39  -0.09  *-0.17  *-0.26  -0.08  0.11  -0.03  -0.13  0.09  -0.01  -0.20  0.01 
GARCH  *-0.42  *-0.18  *-0.16  *-0.26  -0.05  -0.08  -0.03  -0.13  0.11  -0.01  -0.21  -0.03 
Key to Table 1.  The variables  8, are weekly  percentage  changes  in  the exchange  rate against the OEM. 
Autocorrelations are estimated using OL8 and GARCH. The averages shown are for the first and second sets of 
five currencies, respectively, labeled somewhat inaccurately "ERM" and "ERM".  An asterisk denotes significance 
at the 1 percent level (one-sided) 
September 1992 with a  narrow ERM band and many formal  re-alignments,  the turbulent 
Sept92-Dec93 period,  and the more quiet wide-band period as of 1994 that ended in the 
fixed rates for Euro-currencies.  The negative autocorrelations remain clearly present in the 
first  and last subperiods.  Unsurprisingly,  in the turbulent transition period they are less 
pronounced, statistically as well as algebraically.  Note that for the ITL, with its wide band, the 
autocorrelations are weaker, but for core members the coefficients are large not just statistically 
but also economically, with averages in excess of -0.20 and individual cases up to -0.50.  We 
conclude that there was a substantial predictability in daily as well as weekly exchange-rate 
changes. 
2  Regression tests of UIP, weekly data 
2.1  Standard tests 
According to the UIP hypothesis, expected exchange rate changes should be offset by differen-
tials in the interest earned, or, equivalently, by the forward premium. Formally, the hypothesis 
is Et-1(St) = FPt-l> where St  denotes [St - St-ll/St-l, the simple percentage change in the Is the forward bias economically small?  5 
exchange rate, and F Pt-1 denotes the forward premium set at time t - 1 for delivery at t.5  A 
familiar test is to run the Cumby-Obstfeld-Fama (COF) regression of exchange rate changes 
on forward premia, possibly augmented by other variables Xt-1 known at t - 1: 
(2.1) 
The UIP hypotheses predicts 11:0 = 0 = 11:2  and 11:1  = 1. 
In Table 2 we summarize our results for equation (2.1)  on weekly data against the DEM. 
We use two equation-by-equation estimators, OLS and Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH)  (1,1),  and two system estimators, Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Estimates are provided for 
the entire data set and for  each of the three subperiods defined  before.  Since the forward 
premium is  almost a unit-root process,  the regular t-tests vastly overstate the significance; 
thus, we merely list the estimates themselves.  We add St-1 as the obvious candidate for  an 
additional regressor Xt- 1  in (2.1).  The standard deviation for  its coefficient,  11:2,  is given in 
the header of each Panel in the Table. 
In Panel A of Table 2 the overall picture is,  at best, mixed.  At 0.71, the average OLS 
slope for  the forward  premium is  surprisingly good,  in fact,  and the GARCH figure  is  not 
much worse.  Still, this simple mean of just five  estimates, each of dubious and heterogenous 
precision, is not necessarily rellable.  The median slopes are already substantially lower than 
the simple averages, and the system estimators tend to come up with the familiar negative 
slopes.  Upon closer inspection, the positive equation-by-equation slopes are entirely due to the 
statistically suspect middle period, where the size of the estimates is, in addition, bizarre.  In 
the larger subsamples (Panels A2 and A4), negative slopes dominate, and the recent figures are 
worse than the early ones.  The evidence from the COF coefficients is, in short, not reassuring: 
DEM-based test results do not provide any better support for DIP, and there is no improvement 
over time. 
While we observe no clear difference between intra-European versus other rates in Panel A, 
there is a sharp divide in Panel B, where ERM members still show massive negative first-order 
autocorrelation.  Even though the forward premium has been added as a regressor, the 1I:2S in 
5The time subscripts reflect the moment the variable is  known-so t  for  8, and t - 1 for FP or for  the 
risk-free rates for investments between times t - 1 and t.  We compute forward premia using one-week interest 
rates taking into account the two-working-days delivery rule in spot and forward markets, the 365-days-per-year 
convention for GBP and (pre-1999)  BEF interbank money markets, and the 36O-days-per-year convention for 
other currencies. Is the forward bias economicaIly small?  6 
Table 2:  Cumby-Obstfeld-Fama Tests of DIP 
Panel A: COF slope coefficient (lI:d 
coefficients for individual currencies  central values 
BEF  NLG  DKK  FRF  ITL  CHF  GBP  JPY  CAD  USD  avg  med 
AI. Total period (1985/6 - 1998/3) 
OLS  -0.05  0.38  0.69  -0.18  -0.33  1.17  2.07  2.75  0.26  0.30  0.71  0.34 
GARCH  -0.27  -0.06  0.28  -0.30  0.03  0.97  2.25  2.75  0.60  -0.64  0.56  0.15 
FIML  -0.29  -0.17  -0.21  -0.43  -0.03  0.08  0.02  0.02  -0.01  0.02  -0.10  -0.02 
GMM  -0.96  0.12  -0.38  -0.57  1.13  0.22  1.76  3.68  -0.15  0.09  0.49  0.10 
A2.  Early ERM(tight band, 1985/6 - 1992/8) 
OLS  -0.37  -0.21  1.71  -0.33  -0.44  0.38  0.80  -0.42  -1.90  -3.96  -0.47  -0.35 
GARCH  -0.37  -0.36  0.71  -0.41  0.30  0.07  0.83  -1.80  -2.60  -4.69  -0.83  -0.37 
FIML  -0.58  -0.28  1.49  -0.67  -0.28  0.17  -0.62  -0.96  -1.48  -4.42  -0.76  -0.60 
GMM  -0.34  -0.39  0.70  -0.40  1.02  0.22  -0.67  -0.33  -1.85  -2.59  -0.46  -0.36 
A3.  Sept 92  end 94 (turbulence, 1992/9-1993/12) 
OLS  1.74  0.89  -2.42  2.48  -12.53  9.31  3.44  63.30  9.06  57.92  13.32  2.96 
GARCH  2.39  0.18  -2.37  1.61  -12.52  12.00  3.33  62.90  15.52  48.96  13.20  2.86 
FIML  0.57  -0.04  -3.78  -0.62  -3.81  7.13  5.35  12.10  -5.43  19.29  3.08  0.27 
GMM  -0.74  0.61  -13.29  18.43  -11.11  7.25  8.16  333.09  8.50  81.50  43.24  7.71 
A4.  Late ERM(wide band, 1994/1 - 1998/3) 
OLS  -1.11  -4.31  -2.35  -1.55  -3.90  -5.52  -7.23  -7.20  -2.66  -19.06  -5.49  -4.10 
GARCH  -0.58  -1.94  -1.90  -1.55  -3.89  -2.37  -7.23  -7.20  -2.68  -19.07  -4.84  -2.53 
FIML  -2.18  -4.18  -2.22  -1.85  -2.71  -4.15  -1.74  0.31  -5.08  -23.64  -4.74  -2.47 
GMM  1.32  -3.49  -18.33  -1.36  25.55  -22.89  -7.88  -8.53  -3.00  -28.11  -6.67  -5.69 
Panel B:  autoregressIOn coefficIent  (11:2) 
coefficients for individual currencies  averages 
BEF  NLG  DKK  FRF  ITL  CHF  GBP  JPY  CAD  USD  ERM  ERM 
B1.  Total period (1985/6 - 1998/4),0"(11:2) =  0.039 
OLS  -0.28  -0.16  -0.18  -0.48  -0.04  0.10  0.01  0.02  -0.01  0.01  -0.23  -0.02 
GARCH  -0.38  -0.24  -0.12  -0.44  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.01  -0.01  0.04  -0.24  -0.05 
FIML  -0.29  -0.17  -0.21  -0.43  -0.03  0.08  0.02  0.02  -0.01  0.02  -0.23  -0.02 
B2.  Early ERM(tight band, 1985/6 - 1992/8), 0"(11:2)  =  0.052 
OLS  -0.35  -0.30  -0.14  -0.51  -0.03  -0.03  0.00  -0.01  0.03  -0.05  -0.27  -0.06 
GARCH  -0.38  -0.28  -0.07  -0.52  -0.02  -0.12  0.01  0.Q1  0.04  -0.02  -0.25  -0.06 
FIML  -0.35  -0.29  -0.12  -0.46  -0.03  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.04  -0.02  -0.25  -0.03 
B3.  Sept 92  end 93  (turbulence, 1992/9 - 1993/12), 0"(11:2)  =  0.12 
OLS  0.01  -0.05  -0.22  -0.44  -0.03  -0.09  0.06  0.08  0.03  -0.12  -0.15  -0.01 
GARCH  -0.15  0.00  -0.25  -0.35  0.03  -0.00  0.06  0.08  0.10  -0.21  -0.14  -0.02 
FIML  -0.13  -0.09  -0.31  -0.39  0.05  -0.06  0.08  0.05  -0.04  -0.04  -0.17  -0.03 
B4.  Late ERM(wide band, 1994/1 - 1998/3), 0"(11:2)  =  0.066 
OLS  -0.39  -0.14  -0.18  -0.27  -0.09  0.09  -0.05  -0.02  -0.14  0.09  -0.21  -0.07 
GARCH  -0.43  -0.22  -0.17  -0.27  -0.06  0.09  -0.06  -0.02  -0.14  0.11  -0.21  -0.07 
FIML  -0.37  -0.16  -0.16  -0.25  -0.10  0.05  -0.02  0.01  -0.09  0.07  -0.23  -0.05 
Key to Table 2.  The regressands 8t are weekly percentage changes in the exchange rate against the DEM, 
the regressors are the beginning-of-period one-week forward  premium (FH) and the lagged regressand.  The 
estimation methods are OLS, Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) , Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM), and Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH). The p's produced by SAS' 
GMM were absurd and are omitted. The central values shown are, in the top part, the mean and the median, 
and in the lower  part, the mean for  the ERM core currencies (BEF, NLG,  DKK, FRF, CHF, the latter an 
informal member) and the other ones. Is the forward  bias economically small?  7 
Table 3:  : Tests of DIP on extreme v.  modal FPs 
Et-l(St) =  [~+  AoI(p}t-l] + [11:;1 + AII(p}t-l]FPt-l-
coeff  regression coefficients for individual currencies  central values 
BEF  NLG  DKK  FRF  ITL  CHF  GBP  JPY  CAD  USD  avg  med 
split at the 60th percentile 
~l  0.73  -1.61  0.81  -0.17  -2.62  0.93  0.78  -2.45  6.91  -1.15  0.22  0.28 
Al  0.96  1.06  -0.06  1.34  5.21  2.09  -0.61  2.12  -8.06  1.68  0.57  1.20 
split at the 80th percentile 
~l  0.64  -0.68  0.94  0.55  -0.51  -0.43  0.42  -2.06  2.24  1.27  0.24  0.48 
Al  -1.13  -1.40  -0.55  1.06  3.28  -0.54  -0.49  2.49  -2.81  -3.81  -0.39  -0.54 
split at the 90th percentile 
~l  -0.58  0.31  0.17  0.01  -1.48  0.54  2.16  -0.14  0.53  0.14  0.17  0.16 
Al  -0.02  2.27  1.27  0.63  3.21  -0.61  1.32  2.58  0.94  69.73  8.13  1.29 
split at the 95th percentile 
~l  -0.34  -0.38  0.52  0.32  0.53  -0.55  0.28  -0.50  1.50  -1.02  0.04  -0.03 
Al  -2.22  -1.02  1.01  2.33  6.50  2.81  -1.16  -0.82  -2.45  -124.19  -11.92  -0.92 
Key to Table 3.  The regressands  (s.)  are weekly  percentage changes  in the exchange rate (against the 
DEM), the regressors are the beginning-of-period one-week forward  premiums (FPt).  The intercept and slope 
coefficient are allowed to differ depending on whether the observation belongs to the p percent highest in terms 
of cross-sectional variation (Mahalonobis Distance), where p =  5,  10,  20,  40 percent. Estimation is by SUR. 
Table 2 are strikingly similar to the PIS in Table 1.  Thus, forward premia do not at all pick up 
the predictability inherent in the negative autocorrelation of 8.  The significance of the lagged 
changes is puzzling: the phenomenon is quite obvious, there are no near-unit-root complications 
with the lagged change as the regressor, and if this is to be a  missing-variable phenomenon, 
we'd need a risk premium that, miraculously, perfectly mirrors the lagged changes. 
2.2  Tests on "extreme" observations 
One potential explanation of the poor results is  that,  because of transaction costs or risk 
premia, the forward premia are noisy estimators of the true conditional expectation, creating 
the standard errors-in-the-regressor bias towards zero.  To attenuate this, Nissen (1997)  and 
Huismans et al.  (1998)  look at subsamples where forward premia are large,  hoping that for 
these observations the expected changes are unusually large, too.  If  so, the better signal-to-
noise ratio should increase the COF regression coefficients back towards unity. 
We adopt the original Bilson (1984) formulation, a variant of (2.1): 
(2.2) 
In (2.2), the indicator I(P}t-l equals unity if, on day t - 1, the forward premium is  "large", 
that is, belongs to the top p percent of the ranked observations, with p being set equal to 40, Is the forward bias economically small?  8 
20, 10, or 5 percent; otherwise, J(P}t-l equals zero.  6  The regressions use GARCH(l,l). 
Table 3 provides the crucial results, and they are not in favor of VIP.  Ai; we go down the 
table, we do not see the average I\;IS trend upwards.  Nor do we see a Al  that is systematically 
positive and trending upwards as we go down the table.  Thus, the simple errors-in-variables-
like effect Nissen or Huisman et at.  had found in their monthly date against the USD is not 
present in our numbers. 
3  A trading rule test 
If  intra-ERM rates are to a non-trivial extent predictable and one-week interest rates do not 
pick this up, average returns from trading must be positive, at least before costs.  'Ib discover 
whether the potential gains are large, before and after costs, we formally test a trading rule. 
Ideally, we would like to take transaction costs into account at every trade. While Datastream 
has bid-ask rates, these are indicative quotes whose spread substantially overstates the spreads 
in any individual market maker's binding quotes and a fortiori overstate the difference between 
the market's best bid and ask.  'Ib still obtain an approximate answer to the question whether 
the returns exceed the two-way costs, we keep track of the number of trades and compute the 
average before-cost profit per trade, as described in the next section.  This average profit per 
trade can then be judged against the limited information we have about transaction costs-
which is an order of magnitude rather than precise best bids and asks. 
3.1  The Trading Rule 
The purpose of this section is not to find the optimal trading rule, unlike many of the papers 
cited in the introductory section.  Rather, we want to show that even the simple linear relation 
picked  up in our UIP tests provides information with clear economic significance.  The fact 
that more sophisticated rules would have done even better just reinforces that point. 
Our test assumes daily trading.  Ai; we have mentioned, at the daily horizon European rates 
against the DEM tend to exhibit negative first- and second-order autocorrelation.  The linear 
trading rule that tries to measure the potential gains from this phenomenon is implemented 
6Huisman et  al.  work with panel data and a restriction of equal betas across currencies.  Their high/low 
criterion is, accordingly, based on the ranked dispersions of the forward premia within each cross-section.  We 
do not follow their approach as, in our sample, the cross-currency constraint is rejected. Is the forward bias economically small?  9 
in calendar time7 and works as follows.  We take the DEM as the home currency.  Using two 
years of past data, we estimate the first- and second-order correlation coefficients.  Periodically 
these estimates are updated using the most recent 2-year sample.  At any date t - 1, then, our 
contrarian forecast for the next-day change will be a partial reversal of the recent changes: 
(3.3) 
Whenever the predicted net return against the DEM is positive and larger than a pre-set filter 
¢, we receive a "buy FX" signalj likewise we get a "sell FX"  message whenever the predicted 
movement is more negative than -¢. 
We consider three (related) trading rules, the first of which is a "pooled" trading rule, that 
is, one where both buying and selling are possible.  Under this rule, upon a "buy" signal we go 
long FX and short DEMj after the "sell"  recommendation we switch to long DEM and short 
FXj and when there is neither a buy nor a sell signal we do nothing.8  Formally, in the pooled 
trading rule we set Db,t-l = 1 whenever there is a buy recommendation and 0 otherwise, and 
we likewise set DB,t-l = -1 whenever there is a sell recommendation and 0 otherwise.  In the 
equations below, the first two show the raw daily returns on the asset and liability accounts, 
respectively (subscripts A and L), where the Ds activate either a FX or a DEM position.  The 
last equation defines the net return (NR) as the return from the asset account minus the return 
from the liability account: 
Db,t-l(St + r;_l + Strt_l) + (1-Db,t-l)rt-l, where Db = {O,  1} 
(1 + DB,t-l)rt-l - D.,t-l(St + r;_l + Str;_l),  where DB = {O, -1} 
NRt  RA,t - RL,t 




where rt-l (rt-I) is the one-day return on aDEM (FX) money-market investment and between 
dates t-1 and t and St the percentage exchange-rate change over the same period. We recognise 
[(St + rt-I +  Strt_l) - rt-I] as the return, measured in DEM, on a one-day FX investment, in 
excess of the DEM returnj multiplying by (Db,t-I +  D.,t-I), this excess return is "weighted" 
by +  1 in case of a buy signal, -1 in case of a sell, and a zero in case of no signal. 
7 See Bjerring et ai.  (1983) for the difference between event-time and calendar-time studies. 
sit can be verified that, in the equations below, "doing nothing" is shown as having DEM both as the asset 
and the liability, so that the net return is zero.  We need this seemingly Byzantine twist for the annuaiization, 
infra, where both the asset and liability sides need to be fully invested all the time. Is the forward bias economically small?  10 
We also want to test whether the gains are symmetric.  For this purpose we test a separate 
"buy"  strategy, one where DB,t-l  always remains zero (that is,  upon bad news we  liquidate 
a long FX position but we  never actually shortsell FX)j and we  likewise implement a "sell" 
strategy where Db,t-l is never switched to unity:  upon a buy signal we stop short  selling FX (if 
we were short at all) but we never actually go long FX. These one-directional results are relevant 
to a liquidity trader, who is typically interested in a transaction of a particular type. But these 
results can also provide insights related to the forward puzzle, and more specifically whether 
Peso risk is likely to be a major factor or not.9  Given the reputation of the home currency, the 
DEM, for ERM members only one type of parity change is conceivable:  a devaluation of FX. 
Peso risk, if any, should show up especially after a "buy FX" signal (which follows a drop of 
FX), and less after a "sell FX" signal because then the FX has picked up, recently.  In short, 
a positive difference between the average "buy" and "sell"  returns would be consistent with 
differential Peso risk for ERM members. 
3.2  Economic and statistical significance measures 
For the purpose of interpreting the average daily returns obtained this way for various filters 
and currencies,  it is  useful  to correct for  two obvious sources of differences in risk across 
currencies.  First, the average risk premium may differ between, say, ITL and NLG. Second, 
there can be substantial differences as to the times spent long and short each currency.  We 
can correct for these by considering a constant control strategy which is, on average, as risky 
as the trading rule.  Specifically, for each currency we compute the averages of Db and DB,  and 
define a static control strategy where we hold a constant position, equal to Db+D., instead of 
the time-varying one in (3.6).  The excess net return (XNR) then is defined as the net return 
in excess of the net return on the control strategy: 
To assess the statistical significance we consider the expected value: 
E(XNR) = COV[(Db +  DB), (s +  r· + sr· - r)].  (3.8) 
This means that the significance of the mean excess return can be tested in the same way as 
the significance of a covariance or a simple regression coefficient.  Specifically, one regresses the 
9 A peso risk is a small probability of a huge event.  The event is so huge that it affects the true expectation, 
but the probability is so small that the researcher does not observe the event and, therefore, mis-estimates the 
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net return (s +  r* +  sr* - r) on the trading signal (Db +  D 8)'  This test can be done separately 
for the pooled, buy, and sell rules.  We use OLS with Newey-West's corrected t-statistics. 
The above tests bear on mean excess returns per day.  To judge the economic significance we 
complement this in two ways.  First, to see whether returns are sufficient to recover transaction 
costs, we compute average returns per run of signals of the same sign.  Second, to assess the 
likelihood of competing explanations of the forward puzzle, we cumulate the returns over long 
periods and compute p. a.  returns.  The details are as follows. 
In the first variant we compute the average return per run of consecutive signals D of the 
same sign.  Thus, in computing this average, we assume that the trader does not automatically 
close out at the end of each day, but waits until the signal either becomes zero or changes sign. 
Within a given run of similar signals, the returns on the assets and liabilities are cumulated 
separatelylO  and the net value is  computed at the end of the run.  To the speculator,  this 
average return per run is more relevant than the average return per buy or sell day since the 
speculator probably can hold positions longer than one day and incurs the costs only once. 
In the second variant we cumulate the returns over long periods and compute p.a.  returns. 
Again, asset returns are cumulated separately from liability returns, and we compute the final 
net value as 
tn  tn 
net final value = II  (1 + RA,t) - II  (1 + RL,t).  (3.9) 
t=tl  t=tl 
For each strategy, the p.a.  average net return is obtained by computing average returns for 
each of the legs separately: 
tn  tn 
average p.a. net return =  N  II  (1 +  RA,t) - N  II  (1 +  RL,t),  (3.10) 
t=tl  t=tl 
where N  is the time between starting date tl and end date tn  measured in years rather than 
trading days.  The p.a.  excess return then is  computed as the above net return minus  the 
analogous net return on the constant-portfolio control strategy. 
IODirectly compounding the net returns, or a fortiori excess returns, would be hard to interpret since there 
is no implementable strategy that provides this cumulative payoff. Is the forward  bias economically small?  12 
3.3  Risk-free investments 
As mentioned, in Datastream the one-day spot rates are unavailable for  most of the period. 
We use returns from holding a 7-day CD for one day, 
r  =  1 +  it,t+7 * (7/36X)  _  1 
t  1 +  it+l,t+6 * (6/36X)  , 
(3.11) 
where it,t+7 is a p.a. simple interest rate for a 7-day deposit; and 36X equals 365 for BEF and 
GBP, and 360 for other currencies.  The numerator shows the face value of a 7-day investment 
made at t, and the denominator is the 6-day discount factor the next day.  To implement this, 
we need to assume that it+1,t+6 =  it+l,t+7, which, traders confirm, is acceptable.  The results 
are not at all sensitive to this approximation.  In an exploratory run, for  instance, we simply 
took Datastream's "representative short-term" interest data to be one-day spot rates (even 
though, in reality,  they may be three-month rates)  and found  essentially the same results. 
Indeed, the picture hardly changes even if we  set all rates equal to zero.  (These results are 
available on request.)  The reason for the near-irrelevance of interest rates is their independence 
of exchange-rate changes plus the fact that, via the control strategy, any maturity-related bias 
largely disappears. 
3.4  Empirical Results 
Table 4,  Panel A shows total-period p.a.  net excess returns and t-tests on the average daily 
net excess return, for various values of the filter.  We also provide means for  ERM and non-
ERM currencies.  There is  a classification problem with the CHF (not a member, but widely 
viewed as de facto pegged) and the ITL (a member, but with a much wider band). Somewhat 
arbitrarily, we put the CHF into the ERM group and the ITL not; this is conservative in the 
sense that it blurs the differences between the subsamples. 
We  note that across all filters  the returns are unanimously positive for  the continental 
currencies, while they are unsystematic and algebraically small for the other currencies.  The 
returns are systematically significant for  core ERM currencies, most of the time also for  the 
CHF and ITL, but never significant for the GBP and the control group in the strictest sense 
(CAD, JPY, USD). It  clearly pays to decrease the filter from 10 bp to 5 or even 1 bp, but further 
refinements no longer add anything substantial.  The trading rule produces rather impressive 
excess returns:  the ERM-group average for the 1bp rule is 14 percent, and individual-currency 
results range between 8 and 19 percent (between 300 and 650 percent cumulative over eleven Is the forward bias economically smaIl?  13 
Table 4:  Excess p.a. returns for all filters 
coefficients for individual currencies  averages 
BEF  NLG  DKK  FRF  CHF  ITL  GBP  JPY  CAD  USD  ERM  ERM 
rP  (bp)  Panel A:  Pooled (buy and sell), total period (1985/6 - 1987/3) 
10 bp  9.44  10.4  8.42  9.94  2.19  1.3  -0.18  3.49  0.76  -0.92  8.08  0.89 
t-test  *12.61  *11.03  *10.23  *16.81  *3.33  0.97  -0.16  1.12  0.64  -1.17 
5 bp  15.1  13.35  10.12  13.29  3.51  4.41  0.9  4.13  0.1  1.47  11.07  2.20 
t-test  *16.54  *12.55  *10.08  *17.45  *3.93  *2.64  0.50  0.98  0.08  1.04 
1 bp  19.35  15.11  11.9  15.62  8.72  6.46  0.28  2.14  1.17  3.83  14.14  2.78 
t-test  *16.71  *12.19  *9.35  *16.05  *6.78  *3.20  0.09  0.43  0.42  1.60 
.5 bp  19.20  15.61  12.44  15.78  8.48  5.74  -1.05  3.63  1.34  4.11  14.30  2.75 
t-test  *16.54  *12.55  *10.08  *17.45  *3.93  *2.64  0.50  0.98  0.08  1.04 
.1  bp  19.26  15.28  12.49  15.75  9.48  5.14  -2.9  5.11  1.73  4.12  14.45  2.64 
t-test  *15.82  *11.38  *9.21  *15.23  *6.50  *2.38  -0.90  0.92  0.56  1.46 
smpl  Panel B: Pooled (buy and sell), three subperiods, rP=lObp 
1985- 8.84  11.42  4.09  6.63  0.56  0.02  -0.15  5.19  0.72  -0.10  6.31  1.14 
t-test  *5.15  *7.92  *5.85  *11.60  0.69  0.17  -0.12  1.30  0.50  -0.29 
1992- 15.65  28.09  18.20  23.52  1.36  9.83  6.61  18.04  5.84  3.85  17.36  8.83 
t-test  *8.58  *8.62  *8.25  *10.86  *4.42  *6.06  1.09  1.25  1.06  1.24 
1994- 8.31  5.71  8.49  8.54  3.27  0.01  -1.80  -1.05  -0.41  -2.49  6.86  -1.15 
t-test  *10.01  *4.69  * 6.50  *10.05  *3.16  0.04  -1.41  -0.26  -0.27  -2.28 
rule  Panel C: Total period, buy versus sell, various filters 
lObuy  4.68  6.07  4.52  5.00  1.28  0.68  -0.56  2.23  -0.62  -0.77  4.31  0.19 
t-test  *7.85  *8.14  *7.65  *13.32  *4.24  0.65  -0.66  1.24  -0.71  -1.60 
lOsell  4.76  4.32  3.89  4.94  0.91  0.61  0.39  1.26  1.38  -0.15  3.76  0.70 
t-test  *11.12  *10.94  *8.51  *13.83  1.72  1.14  0.39  0.40  1.64  -0.47 
tb-B  -0.11  2.07  0.84  0.12  0.61  0.06  -0.72  0.27  -1.65  -1.07 
5buy  8.13  7.74  5.41  6.85  2.08  2.83  -0.17  3.44  -1.35  0.95  6.04  1.14 
t-test  *12.61  *10.00  *8.26  *14.62  *4.03  2.25  -0.08  1.51  -0.93  1.17 
5sell  6.97  5.61  4.71  6.44  1.43  1.58  1.07  0.69  1.44  0.52  5.03  1.06 
t-test  *13.58  *11.64  *9.02  *15.36  *2.39  2.23  0.85  0.10  1.09  0.45 
tb_.  1.29  0.91  0.98  1.36  0.73  1.08  -0.04  -0.01  0.19  0.28 
1buy  10.23  7.99  6.43  8.30  4.73  4.09  -0.15  -0.59  0.86  2.19  7.54  1.28 
t-test  *16.04  *10.79  *8.73  *15.47  *6.77  *3.24  0.01  0.00  0.64  1.69 
1sell  9.12  7.12  5.48  7.31  3.99  2.37  0.44  2.74  0.31  1.64  6.60  1.50 
t-test  *15.86  *11.74  *8.78  *14.81  *5.50  *2.45  0.16  0.82  0.12  1.10 
tb-B  1.41  *2.34  0.84  0.65  0.82  0.87  -0.50  0.38  -1.42  0.30 
Key to Thble 4.  We use daily data, June 14,  1985 to April 1,  1998 with the DEM as reference currency.  There is  a 
buy signal (D =  1) whenever the exchange-rate chsnge, as predicted by the AR(2) equation, exceeds the filter size t/>;  and 
there is a sell signal (D = -1) when the predicted return is below -t/>.  On D = 1 (-1) we go long FX (DEM) and short 
DEM (FX), while on D =  0 both the short and long side are DEM. Returns are on holding a 7-day DEM or FX riskfree 
investment for one day.  In the control strategy, we follow a static rule of always investing D units (where D is the average 
position for that currency over the entire sample period).  The t-tests are on the mean net return (asset minus Iisbility) 
per dlo/ in excess of the nst return from the trading strategy, and an asterisk indicates significance at 1% one-sided.  The 
returns themselves are compounded and annualized.  The two  average returns in the rightmost columns are oomputed 
over the first and second sets of five currencies, respectively.  Subperiods are (i) is until September 1, 1992; (ii) September 
92 till end 93;  (iii) as of 1994.  In the third part of the table, signals D = -1 are set to D = 0 in the buy-<>nly rule, and 
signals D = 1 are set to D = 0 in the sell-<>nly rule. The rule "10buy" refers to a buy-only game with filter 10, and so on. 
The t-test on the difference between the buy and sell returns is indicated as tb-•. Is the forward bias economically small?  14 
yearsll, that is).  But even the widest filter, 10bp, still pays out a respectable excess average 
return of 8 percent. 
To verify the intertemporal stability and internal validity of the results, and to further re-
duce potential problems of heteroskedasticity, we run all tests also on subperiods, using again 
the tranquillity-versus-turbulence criterion.  To preserve space we just show these subperiod 
results for  the worst-performing filter, lObp.  The summary is in Panel B of Table 4.  Despite 
the much smaller sample sizes,  only one cell loses  its significance rating (CHF in the first 
period).  The numbers remain in remarkable agreement with the total-sample results:  almost 
unanimously clear and positive returns per subperiod for  the core-ERM currencies, less  im-
pressive but positive returns for the CHF and ITL, and essentially random results for the GBP 
and the control currencies JPY, CAD, and USD. For the other filters the results are generally 
stronger but otherwise show the same patterns across currencies and periods. 
In Panel C of the table we check whether the profits stem mostly from the long positions, 
or the short ones.  Results for the 0.5- and O.I-bp filters, being too similar to the I-bp results, 
are omitted.  It turns out that the returns from  the buy-only and sell-only rules  are quite 
comparable.  Each is significant in its own for the hard-core ERM members, often so for ITL 
and CHF, and never so for the outside currencies.  Judging by t-tests, the difference between 
buy and sell is never significimt at the I-percent level except in one case (out of 18-i.e. three 
trading rules x  six continental currencies).  'frue, another case is almost significant (with t = 
2.07), but both the significant and the almost-significant ts occur for the same currency, the 
NLG; and if we want to cite this as evidence of Peso-type risks, then the NLGis surely the 
least convincing candidate. 
From these buy- or sell-only results we conclude that, for liquidity traders whose transaction 
costs are irrelevant, there would have been substantial gains from using the trading rule.  Of 
course, being cumulative returns before transaction costs, the net excess payoffs reported in 
Table 4.C are representative only for liquidity traders that have to do a transaction every day 
(and of a similar size every day).  To provide an idea of the profitability in a  more general 
situation, Table 5 reports the mean profit per run and per signal for various filters,  and for 
the best- and worst-performing filters also the subperiod results.  We see that the large filters, 
which produced the lowest  p.a.  net excess returns,  actually provide the highest  profits per 
signal; thus, in terms of cumulative returns the problem with the large filters obviously is that 
11 We have thirteen years of data but lose two in estimating the ARlMA model. Is the forward  bias economicaIly small?  15 
Table 5:  : Average Abnormal Returns per run and per signal, subperiod results for the largest 
and smallest filters 
Sample  BEF  DKK  FRF  NLG  CHF  ITL  GBP  USD  JPY  CAD 
Panel A:  average profit per run, % 
Filter  Strategy  BEF  DKK  FRF  NLG  CHF  ITL  GBP  USD  JPY  CAD 
0.100  buy  0.20  0.24  0.23  0.24  0.19  0.08  0.06  0.04  0.13  0.08 
sell  0.23  0.21  0.22  0.22  0.10  0.07  0.01  0.07  0.04  0.12 
0.050  buy  0.17  0.19  0.15  0.17  0.12  0.09  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.07 
sell  0.18  0.18  0.16  0.16  0.08  0.10  0.03  om  0.05  0.03 
0.010  buy  0.14  0.15  0.11  0.12  0.08  0.08  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.02 
sell  0.14  0.14  0.11  0.12  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.01 
0.005  buy  0.13  0.14  0.10  0.12  0.07  0.09  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01 
sell  0.14  0.14  0.10  0.12  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.01 
Panel B:  average profit per signal, % 
0.100  buy  0.16  0.19  0.17  0.19  0.17  0.07  0.05  0.03  0.12  0.07 
sell  0.18  0.17  0.17  0.18  0.08  0.06  om  0.07  0.04  0.11 
0.050  buy  0.12  0.13  0.10  0.12  0.09  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.06 
sell  0.14  0.13  0.12  0.12  0.06  0.09  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.03 
0.010  buy  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01 
sell  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.00 
0.005  buy  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.05  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.00 
sell  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.03  0.03  om  0.00  0.02  0.01 
Key to Table 5. There is a buy signal (D=l) whenever the absolute value of the exchange-rate change, 
as predicted by AR(2), exceeds the filter;  and there is a sell signal (D=l) when the predicted return 
is below minus the filter.  The trade, if any,  is a one-working-day forward sale or purchase depending 
on the sign of the predicted change.  The table shows average excess returns (AARs) per trade and per 
run, for strategies where both selling and buying is allowed  (''pooled''), as  well as for strategies with 
either just buying or just selling.  The AARs are averages of gross returns over the entire period (June 
14,  1985 to April 1,  1998), in excess of the return from a static trading strategy consisting of always 
buying forward tJ  units (where tJ  is the average position over the entire sample).  For the AAR per 
signal we assume that the trader liquidates every day.  For the AAR per run we assume that when a 
signal D is followed by another one of the same signs, then the trader rolls over her position until the 
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there are not enough of these trading opportunities.  The question to be settled is whether 
these average returns per trade exceed the transaction costs.  This is one of the topics of the 
concluding section. 
4  Discussion and Conclusion 
We discuss the three potential explanations advanced by Froot and Thaler (1990)-a regular 
risk premium, Peso risk, and learning-and the transaction cost view by e.g.  Baldwin (1990) . 
•  Learning.  Unlike in the case of the US,  there was no pronounced shift in monetary policy 
in the ERM. Also, the system was well known by the time our data start. 
•  A regular risk premium? The regular risk premium is a covariance with a stochastic discount 
factor which,  in turn, is  usually specified as the return on a  portfolio or a  combination 
of portfolios.  We  focus  on the risk premium as specified by the standard CAPM or its 
international version (InCAPM). In these models the portfolios are, in case of the CAPM, 
the market portfolio and,  for  the InCAPM, a combination of the world  market and the 
various countries' T-bills.  In the CAPM, the spot rate's beta can never be large because 
the R2 of an exchange-rate market-model regression is invariably tiny:12 
f3i= 
var(Si) - var(ez)  1 
()  «, 
varrm 
where rm  is the market return and var(ei) the residual variance in the regression of Si  on 
rm, which is almost as large as var(si) itself.  Thus, with such a small beta, even if  the risk 
premium on the market would be 10 percent we would never get anywhere near a 10-percent 
average for  an exchange rate.  True, this argument assumes that the market sensitivity is 
constant, which is not necessarily true. But bear in mind that our calculations removed the 
average risk premium from the returns, and that half of the excess return comes from being 
short; so if we are to explain our 15  percent excess return (and half of it from shorting), 
via a wildy fluctuating beta, then half of the time the beta needs to be of the order of 
magnitude of +1, and half of the time of the order of -1.  This is, again, inconceivable. 
If  the CAPM cannot explain an excess return of 15 percent, might the InCAPM do so? In 
12See for instance, Allayannis (1996) for a review. Is the forward  bias economically small?  17 
the international version an own-variance risk premium is added (Sercu, 1980): 
E(Si +  ri - r) = Aw . cov(si,rw) + (1- Ai) ::  var(si), 
where rw  is  the world-market return;  Ai  (Aw)  is  relative risk aversion for  the country-i 
(world)  investor;  and Wi  (Ww )  is  country i's (the world's)  invested wealth.  But again it 
is implausible that returns of 10 or 20  percent p.a.  would be explained by the new  risk 
premium:  the consensus is that relative risk aversion exceeds unity, making the additional 
risk premium negative. 
•  Peso Risk?  Peso problems are a priori not likely to explain the near-zero slopes for intra-
European rates.  For one thing, while there must have been more-than-occasional episodes 
of re-alignment fears in the sample period, such re-alignments have actually occurred fairly 
frequently.  Also, they were small,  ex post:  Sercu and Uppal (1995,  pp 364-65)  report an 
average devaluation jump size of  4 percent.  Nor can one argue that individual ex ante jumps 
might have been much bigger:  the understanding in the ERM was that a devaluation should 
just undo the cumulative change in the real rate since the previous realignment. Thus, the 
idea that 14 percent is the product of a small probability times a huge jump-size is utterly 
implausible. 
A second line of argument against the Peso explanation is that our COF regression coeffi-
cients for non-European rates are at least is bad as the ERM ones.  If this is to be explained 
by Peso risk, the Boating-rate data would have to be more exposed to that risk-but it is 
hard to conceive what type of catastrophic event could occur in the case of Boating rates. 
Third, if  Peso risk is present, it should have shown up in our trading-rule results: going long 
FX after it has dropped should be the position with comparatively more peso risk, not going 
long DEM after a rise of FX. That is, the returns from buy-only should exceed those from 
sell-only.  While this algebraically true, the observed differences are pairwise insignificant, 
and never amount to more than a fraction of the 14 percent we have to explain away. 
•  The gains are small and risky.  For a committed exporter or importer who is trading very 
frequently, judicious exercising of the option to postpone a purchase or a sale would increase 
revenue by several percentage points. Detailed subperiod results (available on request) show 
that the trading rules never produced negative payoffs over any two-year interval. 
•  Transaction  costs  wipe  out any gains?  An exchange rate is quoted in at least four digits 
(think of a below-par EUR/USD) and often in five digits (like the USD/DEM, of old).  In Is the forward  bias economically small?  18 
the mid 90s,  binding quotes for  USD IDEM were about three pips apart, and the market 
spread between best bid and best ask was occasionally as low as two or one pip (Lyons, 
1998).  Assuming, conservatively, a market spread of three pips and a DEM-per-USD rate 
of 15,000 pips, the two-way cost was at most 2bp.  Of course, our data include lower-volume 
currencies, too, but 6bp is about the maximum for the rates we look at. From Table 5 it is 
unclear whether the small illters would have been profitable to round-trip speculators, but 
the larger filters, that payoff at least 10 percent per trade, have been profitable even after 
transaction costs.  Thus, one cannot claim that transaction costs would have wiped out the 
gains we have observed. 
Is the only remaining explanation, then, a market inefficiency, especially in light of the fact that 
gains exceed the transaction costs? Baldwin (1990) argues that it is not.  Specifically, he points 
out, the observed return differentials should clearly exceed the costs before the arbitrageurs 
would rationally move  in.  'Ii:ue,  the holder of DEM  has the option to shift her funds into 
FX as soon as the expected total return on FX exceeds the return on DEM. However, she will 
normally wait until that option is sufficiently far in the money.  The first reason is one that holds 
for ordinary options, too:  the holder of an American-style option will not exercise as soon as 
it is in the money by a minute amount, but will wait until the payoff is big enough:  immediate 
excercise would kill the (roughly) 50 percent probability that the exercise value increases over 
the next time interval, and the gains from moving deeper into the money outweigh the losses 
from moving back towards the money.  The second reason for delayed exercise is that, if and 
when the investor has shifted her funds into FX, still sooner or later the return on DEM is 
bound to become more attractive again.  But due to the transaction cost, she will then have 
to live with below-normal returns on FX until the loss is sufficiently big to warrant switching 
back to DEM. In short,  to trigger trades,  the return differential has to compensate for the 
transaction cost of moving into and out of FX,  plus the possible regret from  moving in too 
soon, plus the likely cost of reaping below-normal returns before moving out again. In light of 
this, the jury is still out on whether or not transaction costs justify inaction to the extent we 
have witnessed in our data. 
We conclude by a brief wrap-up.  One issue that hampers tests of UIP is that the market's 
expectations are unobservable. In this paper we are able to identify clear non-zero expectations 
from the exchange rate data themselves, for  the simple reason that the ERM  (or perceived 
dirty floating)  induces statistically significant mean-reversion  in daily and weekly exchange 
rates against the DEM.  UIP hypothesizes that this  predictability should be picked  up by Is the forward  bias economically smaIl?  19 
the one-week forward premium, but when running the Cumby-Obstfeld (1984), Fama (1984) 
regression tests of the unbiased expectations hypothesis at the one-week horizon,  we obtain 
essentially zero coefficients for intra-EMS exchange rates (and the familiar negative coefficients 
for  extra-EMS rates).  These slopes are also quite unstable across estimation methods and 
periods. Lastly, lagged exchange rate changes remain significant when added to the regression, 
that is,  forward  premia seem to essentially ignore this source of predictability in exchange 
rates.  Especially this last finding seems damaging to DIP: the mean-reversion is quite simple 
to detect, the lagged change is not at all a near-stationary regressor, and the idea that, over 
time, the risk premium would perfectly mirror the lagged changes looks far-fetched.  Nor can 
one maintain that the phenomenon is economically trivial.  We indeed test a trading rule, and 
find that for a sufficiently large filter the average profit per trade is larger than transaction 
costs.  The size of the profits and the patterns from buy versus sell decisions allow us to reject 
the regular risk premium and the Peso hypotheses too, at least as being sufficient in themselves 
to explain the results.  To figure out whether all this implies a market inefficiency, however, we 
need more insight into the effect of transaction costs on optimal trading. 
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